WEBVTT - Churchill’s The Second World War, Part Twenty-Nine 0:00:04.600 --> 0:00:09.440 Every week. Hillsdale College President Larry Arnn joins Hugh Hewitt 0:00:09.440 --> 0:00:14.120 to discuss great books, great men, and great ideas. This 0:00:14.120 --> 0:00:19.320 is Hillsdale Dialogues, part of the Hillsdale College Podcast Network. 0:00:19.320 --> 0:00:25.680 More episodes@podcast.hillsdale.edu or wherever you find your audio. 0:00:30.000 --> 0:00:32.919 Morning. Glory. Evening Grace. America. That music means it's the 0:00:32.920 --> 0:00:35.120 last broadcast hour of the week. That means it's time 0:00:35.120 --> 0:00:38.200 for the Hillsdale Dialogue. Doctor Ron and I are done 0:00:38.200 --> 0:00:42.920 celebrating the semi sesquicentennial, and we're back into Churchill's World 0:00:42.920 --> 0:00:46.360 War Two memoirs, volume two. Their finest hour. Last week, 0:00:46.360 --> 0:00:50.599 Doctor Arnn, you were talking about, um, Churchill's comment to 0:00:50.600 --> 0:00:53.480 the French that those nations that die fighting rise again. 0:00:53.680 --> 0:00:56.319 And you're also talking about how the French collapse may 0:00:56.320 --> 0:00:59.800 have been, in part linked to the exhaustion of the 0:00:59.800 --> 0:01:03.340 French Republic after World War One. I am curious, as 0:01:03.340 --> 0:01:04.900 it occurred to me when we were talking, I wanted 0:01:04.900 --> 0:01:09.020 to ask you about it this week. When Reagan arrived 0:01:09.459 --> 0:01:13.300 after Vietnam and after Carter, he had to start again 0:01:13.300 --> 0:01:17.660 to rebuild sort of American fighting will. And he did 0:01:17.660 --> 0:01:21.780 it with Grenada. And then George H.W. Bush did it 0:01:21.780 --> 0:01:25.940 with Panama and then George W Bush. We went to 0:01:25.980 --> 0:01:30.020 war for 20 years and were exhausted again. And we 0:01:30.020 --> 0:01:37.179 got out ignobly from Afghanistan in 2021 and a haphazard, 0:01:37.180 --> 0:01:42.180 disastrous and deeply humiliating retreat. What do you make of 0:01:42.180 --> 0:01:47.820 the idea that Donald Trump is rebuilding the American capacity 0:01:47.860 --> 0:01:51.740 for force with this battle with Iran in a way 0:01:51.740 --> 0:01:56.460 that is necessary, limited, precise, and deadly when it's unleashed? 0:01:57.860 --> 0:02:03.680 Yeah. That's it limited Um, uh, we we fell into 0:02:03.680 --> 0:02:07.520 a period, uh, unique in American history when we were 0:02:07.680 --> 0:02:11.720 the only superpower. And so we thought we could do anything. 0:02:12.000 --> 0:02:15.680 And you mix that up with the principles of liberal imperialism, 0:02:16.360 --> 0:02:19.240 which include statements like, we can't be safe until the 0:02:19.240 --> 0:02:25.000 world is free. Uh, my favorite is Colin Powell saying, 0:02:25.040 --> 0:02:28.680 when we invaded Iraq the first time, after they had 0:02:29.480 --> 0:02:32.600 attacked a neighbor and the neighbor appealed to us for help, 0:02:32.639 --> 0:02:34.320 it means we can do that if we want to. 0:02:34.880 --> 0:02:39.520 But he said, if you break it, you own it. And, uh, 0:02:39.560 --> 0:02:43.520 that means that we have to fix it, right? Well, 0:02:44.280 --> 0:02:46.639 Trump hasn't said anything like that. What he said is 0:02:46.639 --> 0:02:49.560 we're going to stop them threatening us and our neighbors, 0:02:50.040 --> 0:02:53.840 and we're going to do what it takes to do that. And, uh, 0:02:54.000 --> 0:02:57.080 that means that it's up to us how far we go. 0:02:57.440 --> 0:03:03.019 So that's limited, Right? Because you can't study Churchill carefully 0:03:03.860 --> 0:03:12.220 without understanding his constant reluctance about and fear about war. Uh, 0:03:12.500 --> 0:03:15.700 he you know, you don't you don't do it for 0:03:15.700 --> 0:03:20.019 a demonstration. You do it because you have to. And 0:03:20.020 --> 0:03:22.860 you'll be less likely to have to if you're ready 0:03:22.860 --> 0:03:26.500 to do it. So that's the old wisdom, right? And 0:03:26.500 --> 0:03:26.860 I think. 0:03:27.139 --> 0:03:29.700 It's interesting that you bring up and that's not in 0:03:29.700 --> 0:03:32.540 our notes or our outline. Uh, General Powell, who of 0:03:32.540 --> 0:03:34.900 course became secretary of State Powell, but he was a general. 0:03:34.900 --> 0:03:38.460 He was a military man because Churchill has a not 0:03:38.460 --> 0:03:42.580 a jaundiced eye, but a skeptical eye about generals making policy. 0:03:42.860 --> 0:03:46.940 And it comes up in this chapter, chapter ten. General Weygand, 0:03:46.940 --> 0:03:50.580 who is their their boss of bosses, their number one general, 0:03:50.980 --> 0:03:56.020 he decides, he decides. The general decides that it's time 0:03:56.020 --> 0:04:00.200 to quit. And Churchill says he used his supreme political 0:04:00.200 --> 0:04:03.480 position far beyond the limits which his professional responsibility, as 0:04:03.480 --> 0:04:07.280 great as they were, were justified or required. He asserted. 0:04:07.280 --> 0:04:10.320 The right of a soldier to dominate the duly constituted 0:04:10.320 --> 0:04:14.760 government of the Republic, as did Marshal Patton. And I 0:04:14.960 --> 0:04:18.800 sense in Churchill a. I don't sense, I read in 0:04:18.800 --> 0:04:21.800 Churchill a great skepticism of generals stepping into the role 0:04:21.800 --> 0:04:24.520 of statesmen. AM I right about that? Oh, yes. 0:04:25.160 --> 0:04:28.280 Well, if they get elected right, they have to become statesmen. Right. 0:04:28.279 --> 0:04:31.600 But the idea that they get to decide. Remember, that's 0:04:31.640 --> 0:04:35.920 a that's a thing in human affairs. In every human organization, 0:04:36.839 --> 0:04:40.480 people have a job and they think because of that job, 0:04:40.480 --> 0:04:45.080 they can control more than that job. And they try 0:04:45.080 --> 0:04:49.160 to control things for which they don't have responsibility. Nobody 0:04:49.160 --> 0:04:54.560 gave general responsibility for the future and being of France, 0:04:54.960 --> 0:04:59.780 but he effectively exercised that authority for a time. And 0:04:59.779 --> 0:05:04.420 that was just wrong. And what Churchill thought was, you know, 0:05:04.460 --> 0:05:07.500 Churchill is a follower of the principles of the Declaration 0:05:07.500 --> 0:05:10.500 of Independence. And what do they say? The purpose of 0:05:10.500 --> 0:05:13.740 a government is to defend the rights of its people, 0:05:13.740 --> 0:05:17.780 and it gets its authority from their consent. Well, nobody 0:05:17.779 --> 0:05:22.180 consented to Vigan making those decisions. He just happened to 0:05:22.180 --> 0:05:26.660 have supposedly at least control of the military. And so 0:05:26.660 --> 0:05:30.900 there was nobody I mean, I mentioned last week that 0:05:30.900 --> 0:05:36.900 Victor Hanson writes about the amazing effectiveness of Britain in 0:05:36.900 --> 0:05:40.420 the Second World War, how much they got out of themselves. Right. 0:05:40.779 --> 0:05:43.980 And they mortgaged their future to do it. And Churchill 0:05:43.980 --> 0:05:46.260 didn't want to do that and always called it the 0:05:46.260 --> 0:05:49.700 unnecessary war. But now you're in the gang war, and 0:05:49.700 --> 0:05:53.180 somebody's got to command all the efforts of the nation 0:05:53.500 --> 0:05:58.060 toward victory. That's what he did. Well, there wasn't anybody 0:05:58.060 --> 0:06:02.520 at the top ready to do that? Uh, Churchill meets 0:06:02.520 --> 0:06:06.840 the son of Clemenceau from the First World War. The tiger, 0:06:07.040 --> 0:06:09.559 they called it. And at the end of the First 0:06:09.560 --> 0:06:13.120 World War, Clemenceau took power. And he did do that. 0:06:13.120 --> 0:06:17.680 And Churchill marveled at that and admired that very much, 0:06:17.680 --> 0:06:21.200 and did that himself later. Well, the son of Clemenceau 0:06:21.240 --> 0:06:24.279 Churchill Records, in these chapters that we're reading, he had 0:06:24.279 --> 0:06:27.280 the spirit of his daddy in him, and Churchill thought 0:06:27.279 --> 0:06:28.880 that was missing at the top. 0:06:29.240 --> 0:06:31.560 Well, he said Renault was not up to it. And 0:06:31.560 --> 0:06:35.000 this is a quote, uh, France would have needed a Cromwell, 0:06:35.040 --> 0:06:38.680 a Clemenceau, a Stalin or a Hitler. It's a and 0:06:38.720 --> 0:06:42.800 that's a silent reflection on himself. Capacity married to Will, 0:06:43.080 --> 0:06:46.760 married to, um, a country that's got the ability to 0:06:46.800 --> 0:06:50.040 rise to the occasion. As Victor Davis Hanson noted, he's 0:06:50.040 --> 0:06:54.560 not complimenting Stalin or Hitler's moral character. He is recognized. 0:06:54.600 --> 0:06:56.680 And I'm sure he's not a big fan of Cromwell, 0:06:56.960 --> 0:07:03.460 but is recognizing, uh, data, uh, there too. Um, what 0:07:03.460 --> 0:07:09.060 what Machiavelli. Well, put down as the essential ingredient. Sure. 0:07:09.100 --> 0:07:12.140 Uh, there's that charge against Donald Trump, the old one 0:07:12.140 --> 0:07:17.140 about the Playboy interview where he congratulates the Chinese on 0:07:17.140 --> 0:07:20.660 their strength. Well, he also says in that same interview 0:07:20.660 --> 0:07:25.420 that they're horrible. Their policies are horrible. But. And see, 0:07:25.460 --> 0:07:32.060 here's what I think is the distinction. Strength is urgently necessary. 0:07:32.380 --> 0:07:36.420 But Churchill was fond of saying, kindness is better than strength. 0:07:36.780 --> 0:07:39.740 But you actually need some strength in order to be kind. 0:07:39.980 --> 0:07:44.020 And so, you know, when you take a responsibility like that, 0:07:44.300 --> 0:07:48.540 if Hillsdale College fails, it'll be my fault, right? And 0:07:48.540 --> 0:07:51.700 that's why that's where I get my authority from the 0:07:51.700 --> 0:07:54.740 mission of the college, from its well-being, and from the 0:07:54.740 --> 0:07:58.000 people I work with. And I have to use it 0:07:58.000 --> 0:08:01.239 only for that. And it means that while I have 0:08:01.240 --> 0:08:05.920 the job, I'm stuck. Something goes wrong. It's my fault. Well, 0:08:06.440 --> 0:08:12.320 if you take that attitude, then you might be capable 0:08:12.320 --> 0:08:15.920 of command in an urgent situation. I've never been in 0:08:15.920 --> 0:08:19.080 a situation as urgent as the ones we're describing here, 0:08:19.560 --> 0:08:22.920 but all of us face in life urgent situations, and 0:08:22.920 --> 0:08:28.600 we have to discharge our responsibilities. That's what our authority, 0:08:28.640 --> 0:08:30.520 whatever it is we have, is for. 0:08:31.160 --> 0:08:34.560 That's so yeah, that's well put. Let's talk now about 0:08:35.000 --> 0:08:39.200 the the French fleet because it's a little known aspect 0:08:39.200 --> 0:08:42.320 of the war. But Churchill had spotted it not long 0:08:42.320 --> 0:08:46.120 after he became prime minister after Chamberlain stepped down. He 0:08:46.160 --> 0:08:50.440 begins to lobby Darlan, who's the the chief of naval operations. 0:08:50.440 --> 0:08:52.640 He's in command of the French fleet. But he's he's 0:08:52.640 --> 0:08:56.560 an admiral. He's not a minister. And he says to Darlan, 0:08:56.559 --> 0:08:58.100 we got to have the French fleet. We got to 0:08:58.100 --> 0:09:00.660 have the French fleet. And Darlan says to him, of 0:09:00.660 --> 0:09:03.819 course you'll get the French fleet. Well, France is collapsing 0:09:04.260 --> 0:09:07.860 and Churchill sends out his IOU for the fleet and 0:09:07.860 --> 0:09:11.700 Darlan doesn't deliver. He said I'd become the Minister of Maritime. 0:09:11.940 --> 0:09:14.100 What does that mean? What was he trying to do? 0:09:14.100 --> 0:09:19.579 Their bargain. So, first of all, a very pregnant letter 0:09:19.580 --> 0:09:22.660 in these chapters is the letter that Churchill wrote to 0:09:22.700 --> 0:09:24.340 Roosevelt on the 15th of June. 0:09:24.380 --> 0:09:24.980 Oh, yes. 0:09:25.460 --> 0:09:29.300 And I invite people to read that and see that 0:09:29.300 --> 0:09:34.060 Churchill appeals to Roosevelt entirely on the basis of the 0:09:34.059 --> 0:09:38.020 interest of the United States of America. Yep. He says 0:09:38.500 --> 0:09:43.140 if their fleet goes bad, that's a grievous fact. But 0:09:43.500 --> 0:09:48.180 what will be become of our fleet? I would never 0:09:48.179 --> 0:09:53.020 surrender our fleet to the Germans. But will I be 0:09:53.020 --> 0:09:57.240 in charge if there's an invasion? You have to think 0:09:57.240 --> 0:10:00.040 about that, because the British fleet was bigger than the 0:10:00.040 --> 0:10:02.720 American fleet at the time. And if you put it 0:10:02.720 --> 0:10:05.239 together with the French fleet, and he points this out. 0:10:05.240 --> 0:10:05.920 And the German. 0:10:05.920 --> 0:10:06.679 Fleet, that would. 0:10:07.200 --> 0:10:08.679 And the German way bigger. 0:10:09.360 --> 0:10:10.120 That's right. 0:10:10.160 --> 0:10:13.080 And so don't go anywhere, America. We'll come back and 0:10:13.080 --> 0:10:17.599 talk about FDR, Churchill, the considerations that went into everything. 0:10:17.640 --> 0:10:24.280 The dialogue is underway. All things hillsdale@hillsdale.edu. And everything. All 0:10:24.280 --> 0:10:28.800 the Hillsdale Dialogue at Q four hillsdale.com. I'm Hugh Hewitt 0:10:28.800 --> 0:10:31.480 with Doctor Larry Arnn, president of Hillsdale College, talking about 0:10:31.480 --> 0:10:34.280 Winston Churchill, World War II memoir. We're talking about the 0:10:34.280 --> 0:10:38.000 fleet and the very delicate dance of memos between Winston 0:10:38.000 --> 0:10:41.000 Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt at the time. Doctor Arnn. 0:10:41.320 --> 0:10:44.400 Another very delicate thing, because, you know, first of all, 0:10:44.400 --> 0:10:46.560 these memos are really great to read because you've got 0:10:46.559 --> 0:10:50.400 to remember Churchill's writing these things when he's traveling four 0:10:50.400 --> 0:10:54.200 times to France during the collapse of France and after 0:10:54.200 --> 0:10:57.300 he's been prime minister since the 10th of May, and 0:10:57.300 --> 0:11:00.300 all this is over by the middle of June. And 0:11:00.460 --> 0:11:04.380 he writes these memos to the French and to Roosevelt. 0:11:04.420 --> 0:11:07.260 The most important memos he wrote were to those two parties. 0:11:07.980 --> 0:11:13.380 And and, uh, uh, the French say to him, we 0:11:13.380 --> 0:11:17.260 want you to release us from our obligation not to 0:11:17.300 --> 0:11:22.540 make a separate peace. That's that's hard. You know, we're collapsing. 0:11:22.540 --> 0:11:27.540 We're suffering there. We're disorganized. They're going to take over 0:11:27.540 --> 0:11:31.300 France and subject the whole of France to the Gestapo. 0:11:31.820 --> 0:11:33.820 And we don't want that. We can make a deal 0:11:33.860 --> 0:11:38.179 to prevent that. Release us. Think of the strength of 0:11:38.220 --> 0:11:42.620 that appeal. And what does Churchill reply? Once he gives, 0:11:42.660 --> 0:11:45.460 he gives the reply twice. He gives it once. And 0:11:45.460 --> 0:11:48.619 he says, we are never going to waste any time 0:11:49.300 --> 0:11:54.660 recriminating against France, whatever it does. But this is not 0:11:54.660 --> 0:11:59.440 the last battle that will happen in England, and you 0:11:59.480 --> 0:12:03.040 should exhaust your resources all the way down to North Africa, 0:12:03.040 --> 0:12:08.240 if you must, to carry on the battle. Then they 0:12:08.240 --> 0:12:13.920 retire and. And Churchill. And who's with him? Beaverbrook, his 0:12:13.920 --> 0:12:18.360 good friend, who he gives him a huge Churchill compliment 0:12:18.360 --> 0:12:23.280 in this chapter. Always a good man under pressure. And 0:12:23.280 --> 0:12:28.600 Lord Halifax, a reformed appeaser there with him, and they 0:12:28.600 --> 0:12:30.800 retired to the garden and talk for half an hour 0:12:30.800 --> 0:12:32.880 and then come back. Churchill comes back and gives the 0:12:32.880 --> 0:12:37.479 same answer, and he gives that answer in writing again later. 0:12:37.480 --> 0:12:40.439 And then he tells Roosevelt. He gave that answer, that, 0:12:40.440 --> 0:12:43.200 in other words, I didn't agree with them, to release 0:12:43.200 --> 0:12:46.120 them from a pact that we made a blood pact, 0:12:46.280 --> 0:12:51.040 not to make a separate peace because we're going to 0:12:51.040 --> 0:12:55.860 fight on. And they should too. And that, you see that's. 0:12:56.660 --> 0:12:57.220 Aren't those. 0:12:57.980 --> 0:12:58.420 They are. 0:12:58.460 --> 0:12:59.260 Cataclysmic. 0:12:59.300 --> 0:13:02.860 What do you make of of FDR in this exchange 0:13:02.860 --> 0:13:06.860 for the benefit of the audience? Um, FDR writes France, 0:13:06.860 --> 0:13:09.380 encouraging them not to surrender and not to give up 0:13:09.380 --> 0:13:14.020 the fight. And Churchill, although it's very I went full 0:13:14.020 --> 0:13:15.740 Strauss in here, tried to read it 3 or 4 0:13:15.740 --> 0:13:19.100 times to figure out whether or not Winston Churchill was 0:13:19.100 --> 0:13:23.540 willing that FDR had agreed to publish the telegram, or 0:13:23.540 --> 0:13:27.540 whether FDR had actually agreed to publish the telegram and 0:13:27.540 --> 0:13:30.580 changed his mind. I can't decipher it. I so I 0:13:30.620 --> 0:13:34.420 can't say for certain whether or not FDR said, go 0:13:34.420 --> 0:13:37.220 ahead and publish my telegram, because Churchill thought it would 0:13:37.260 --> 0:13:39.420 buck up the French and Reynaud thought it would buck 0:13:39.420 --> 0:13:42.100 up the French, because FDR is saying, fight on, fight on. 0:13:42.100 --> 0:13:44.620 And FDR says, oh, the State Department says, I can't 0:13:44.620 --> 0:13:48.420 publish the Telegraph. What did you make of that by FDR? 0:13:48.460 --> 0:13:50.459 I thought it was disappointing. 0:13:51.179 --> 0:13:57.840 No, it's a good thing. uh, that, uh, we were 0:13:57.840 --> 0:14:00.960 reluctant to go into that war. Uh, we were reluctant 0:14:00.960 --> 0:14:03.880 to go into the First World War two. And, and 0:14:03.880 --> 0:14:08.200 we went into both of them upon being attacked. Right. 0:14:08.240 --> 0:14:11.720 And that's, and we didn't have agreements in advance of 0:14:11.720 --> 0:14:13.840 either of those wars that we would come to the 0:14:13.840 --> 0:14:19.680 defense of those countries. Roosevelt wanted to. And, and the 0:14:19.680 --> 0:14:24.600 reasons he wanted to are in that memo that Churchill 0:14:24.600 --> 0:14:28.360 wrote him. When Churchill and Roosevelt began writing each other, 0:14:28.360 --> 0:14:32.840 they write each other as former naval persons. Roosevelt had 0:14:32.840 --> 0:14:36.040 been assistant secretary to the Navy. And see, you have 0:14:36.040 --> 0:14:40.360 to make a link if you can, between the thought 0:14:40.360 --> 0:14:42.840 of the American founders, the authors of the Declaration of 0:14:42.840 --> 0:14:47.800 Independence and this policy in the Second World War. And 0:14:47.800 --> 0:14:53.040 that link is broken in part because Franklin Roosevelt was 0:14:53.640 --> 0:14:58.500 a modern liberal reinterpreting the Declaration of Independence into something else. 0:14:58.700 --> 0:15:01.220 I argue right? That's a big argument, right? We're not 0:15:01.220 --> 0:15:08.500 making it here, but it's also maintained because Roosevelt reads 0:15:08.660 --> 0:15:13.700 about what's going to happen to America if the seas 0:15:13.740 --> 0:15:18.340 are dominated by hostile powers. And that becomes a prospect 0:15:18.340 --> 0:15:22.980 that's open. Right. Roosevelt was. He was assistant secretary of 0:15:22.980 --> 0:15:28.020 the Navy. And, you know, the great, the great. What 0:15:28.060 --> 0:15:34.180 the great explainer of British power is a man named 0:15:34.180 --> 0:15:39.100 Alfred Thayer Mahan, who was a late 19th, early 20th 0:15:39.100 --> 0:15:44.300 century figure at the Naval Institute in America. And he 0:15:44.300 --> 0:15:47.380 wrote The Influence of Sea Power on history. And he 0:15:47.500 --> 0:15:52.140 it's a very powerful book, and it's still fundamental to 0:15:52.180 --> 0:15:57.400 strategic thinking in West today in China, too. Yeah. And 0:15:57.400 --> 0:16:00.480 what does it say? It says the cheapest, fastest way 0:16:00.520 --> 0:16:03.960 to to move goods. Goods around the earth is by sea. 0:16:04.960 --> 0:16:07.560 And so sea power matters a lot. It mattered very 0:16:07.560 --> 0:16:11.120 much to the founders of the country. And so, uh, 0:16:11.120 --> 0:16:14.560 Roosevelt knows that, right? And we've always been for freedom 0:16:14.560 --> 0:16:17.840 of the seas. We always had serious navy from the 0:16:17.840 --> 0:16:23.280 Revolutionary War on. And, and so to have that under 0:16:23.280 --> 0:16:26.000 the hands of a continental power, I mean, it's just 0:16:26.000 --> 0:16:29.560 a fact that the Chinese Navy is bigger than ours today. 0:16:30.120 --> 0:16:34.200 And China has a multiple of our shipbuilding capacity today. 0:16:34.600 --> 0:16:36.280 That's a serious fact. 0:16:36.760 --> 0:16:40.480 And did you notice, though, doctor, that when our Apache 0:16:40.520 --> 0:16:45.720 helicopter went down, we dispatched a drone made by Saronic. 0:16:46.160 --> 0:16:49.240 And it looks like, God forgive me. I hope I 0:16:49.240 --> 0:16:52.440 don't offend the PT boat people. It looks very much 0:16:52.440 --> 0:16:55.860 like a PT boat from World War Two or a 0:16:56.620 --> 0:16:59.780 swift boat from Vietnam, but it doesn't have anyone on it. 0:17:00.340 --> 0:17:04.340 It just goes and picks up our pilots. That's a revolution. 0:17:05.619 --> 0:17:08.379 Well, there's a very good. I just got it this morning. 0:17:08.380 --> 0:17:10.500 I haven't read it all yet, but there's a man 0:17:10.500 --> 0:17:13.140 named Dennis Blair who was a big naval commander in 0:17:13.140 --> 0:17:16.620 the Pacific. And he published an article about the question, 0:17:16.619 --> 0:17:20.699 Can China take Taiwan? And he says there's just a 0:17:20.700 --> 0:17:24.020 lot of developments that make that very doubtful now. And 0:17:24.020 --> 0:17:27.300 we can't rest on our laurels. But, you know, I mean, 0:17:27.300 --> 0:17:30.900 one of the things that's been displayed in Iran is 0:17:30.900 --> 0:17:34.700 that we have made a lot of progress against these. 0:17:34.740 --> 0:17:38.820 And with these drone weapons and in knocking them down, 0:17:38.859 --> 0:17:42.980 not having to spend a $2 million weapon to knock 0:17:42.980 --> 0:17:46.580 down a $30,000 drone. And so there's a lot of 0:17:46.580 --> 0:17:49.100 innovation going on right now. A lot of it comes 0:17:49.100 --> 0:17:54.639 from Anduril, and that's Palmer Luckey's company. And that's just 0:17:54.640 --> 0:17:55.680 awesome to me. 0:17:55.720 --> 0:17:58.359 It's awesome to me too. And there in Ohio, doctor 0:17:58.359 --> 0:18:00.800 or not. Michigan. There in Ohio. We'll come back. Hopefully 0:18:00.800 --> 0:18:03.760 I'll evade some anti Ohio talk from Doctor Arnn. Don't 0:18:03.760 --> 0:18:07.520 go anywhere America. Welcome back America. I'm Hugh Hewitt talking 0:18:07.520 --> 0:18:10.760 with Doctor Larry Arnn about the new technologies of war everywhere. 0:18:11.200 --> 0:18:14.320 A lot of it comes as well from Ukraine I'll 0:18:14.320 --> 0:18:16.960 remind you. Four years ago when the Russians invaded and 0:18:16.960 --> 0:18:19.200 we thought it would be a two week war, you 0:18:19.240 --> 0:18:22.440 made the comment. And then history has surprises like this. 0:18:22.440 --> 0:18:26.800 Zelensky fellow. Ukraine's a surprise. And the ability that they 0:18:26.840 --> 0:18:30.720 have demonstrated with drones is a remarkable surprise. I mean, 0:18:30.760 --> 0:18:31.800 world changing. Yeah. 0:18:32.800 --> 0:18:34.400 Yeah. And they're getting a lot of help. 0:18:34.400 --> 0:18:37.080 And we're helping them. 0:18:37.440 --> 0:18:41.920 You know. Yeah. Well, a lot of people are. And 0:18:41.920 --> 0:18:46.320 I probably especially us and you know, we're learning from 0:18:46.320 --> 0:18:52.500 that and, uh, uh, it, you know, we, it is 0:18:52.500 --> 0:19:01.460 a sad commentary. That we're in danger all the time now, right? 0:19:01.500 --> 0:19:06.740 And for much of American history, that wasn't true. And 0:19:06.740 --> 0:19:11.859 we're safer than anybody, at least anybody powerful. But we've 0:19:11.859 --> 0:19:16.260 got we're subject to immediate attack. And that means being 0:19:16.260 --> 0:19:21.100 ready and having a superior military at the cheapest possible 0:19:21.100 --> 0:19:26.380 cost is urgently needed to any republic like ours. 0:19:27.020 --> 0:19:31.219 Let me also, we're talking about naval power. And man, uh, 0:19:31.220 --> 0:19:35.859 the Strait of Hormuz demonstrates again that, uh, what seems 0:19:35.859 --> 0:19:39.780 like a fight far away with a country we know 0:19:39.820 --> 0:19:44.900 much about Oman and UAE and Iran is actually about 0:19:45.220 --> 0:19:49.139 the world's health. You can't allow international waterways to be 0:19:49.140 --> 0:19:52.320 dominated by a malign power by by any power, unless 0:19:52.320 --> 0:19:54.440 it's the Panama Canal and they own it, or we 0:19:54.440 --> 0:19:57.439 own it and gave it to them. You can't let 0:19:57.440 --> 0:20:01.000 the Straits of Malacca or the Strait of Hormuz or 0:20:01.000 --> 0:20:04.200 any of the narrow waterways, the Taiwan Strait, be dominated 0:20:04.200 --> 0:20:07.280 by one power, or the whole world suffers. That's why 0:20:07.280 --> 0:20:11.520 I think you mentioned that our Constitution specifically doesn't say 0:20:11.520 --> 0:20:14.280 anything about a standing army says we are to provide 0:20:14.320 --> 0:20:16.800 and maintain a navy that's in the Constitution. 0:20:16.840 --> 0:20:21.280 Yeah. That's right. Yeah. We didn't see that's and see 0:20:21.680 --> 0:20:23.960 put a point right. First of all, as I say, 0:20:23.960 --> 0:20:28.760 all proper reasoning about international security and foreign policy begins 0:20:28.760 --> 0:20:31.600 with the interest of the United States. Well, we're a 0:20:31.600 --> 0:20:36.000 net oil exporter and we hope to remain so. I 0:20:36.000 --> 0:20:39.680 hope we do. But we're also a huge oil importer, 0:20:39.960 --> 0:20:43.720 and that has to do with refining capacity and kinds 0:20:43.720 --> 0:20:45.880 of oil and which kinds we can refine and which 0:20:45.880 --> 0:20:50.440 kinds we produce and don't produce. And those are sticky problems, right. 0:20:50.800 --> 0:20:55.659 And so, you know, the world has a world price 0:20:55.980 --> 0:20:59.780 and we got to buy a lot of it. And so, yeah, 0:20:59.780 --> 0:21:03.260 the interest of the United States is wrapped up in this. And, uh, 0:21:03.580 --> 0:21:05.380 the Strait of Hormuz turns out to be a very 0:21:05.380 --> 0:21:10.700 sticky problem. Uh, and, uh, we will see because we haven't, 0:21:10.700 --> 0:21:15.660 we haven't, we have won the war in Iran so far. 0:21:16.220 --> 0:21:17.659 We will see how it comes out. 0:21:18.540 --> 0:21:20.860 Let me go back to last week and then bring 0:21:20.859 --> 0:21:23.900 it forward. Uh, you mentioned last week that Churchill wrote 0:21:23.900 --> 0:21:28.060 the prime Ministers of the dominions. In that letter, he wrote, uh, 0:21:28.060 --> 0:21:32.820 to Australia, New Zealand, Canada and South Africa, quote, Hitler 0:21:32.820 --> 0:21:35.580 will have to break us in this island or lose 0:21:35.580 --> 0:21:40.980 the war. He then on June 18th, gives this remarkable speech. 0:21:40.980 --> 0:21:45.260 We don't have the audio of it. Um, uh, which 0:21:45.260 --> 0:21:49.420 is the finest hour speech? Do you have an account 0:21:49.420 --> 0:21:52.200 of how the British people reacted to that speech? 0:21:52.680 --> 0:21:56.760 Yeah, many. It was, uh, that that is the one 0:21:57.000 --> 0:22:01.320 where like it is first of all, he did broadcast 0:22:01.320 --> 0:22:05.440 the speech. That is the one where people were now 0:22:05.440 --> 0:22:10.439 focused on the problem. Uh, you know, in other words, uh, 0:22:11.400 --> 0:22:15.320 when the war started, nobody knew what to expect, you know, 0:22:15.359 --> 0:22:19.040 and then to be losing on such a scale and 0:22:19.040 --> 0:22:25.400 so fast that violated the pace of the First World War, which, 0:22:25.520 --> 0:22:27.640 you know, they lost some battles in the beginning, but 0:22:27.640 --> 0:22:31.880 within three weeks that settled down into trench warfare and 0:22:31.880 --> 0:22:36.439 France didn't surrender. And what, six weeks, how long it took. 0:22:37.359 --> 0:22:40.480 So they're getting used to that. And then he gives 0:22:40.480 --> 0:22:44.640 the speech. And it's worth noting, you know, the peroration 0:22:44.640 --> 0:22:48.719 of the speech at the end is, uh, if the 0:22:48.720 --> 0:22:52.700 British Empire should last a thousand years. Men will still 0:22:52.700 --> 0:22:56.500 say this was their finest hour. Remember that? That's kind 0:22:56.500 --> 0:23:01.180 of a doleful prediction, too. This is the peak. What 0:23:01.180 --> 0:23:05.860 comes later is lower. And that means the Churchill against 0:23:05.859 --> 0:23:09.260 its will and never willing to do that. Another time 0:23:09.260 --> 0:23:13.980 in his life was putting all the chips on the table. Uh, 0:23:14.420 --> 0:23:17.980 that when he said to the French nations that die fighting, 0:23:17.980 --> 0:23:21.060 rise up again, those that surrender tamely are gone forever. 0:23:21.380 --> 0:23:23.900 He was prepared to live by that creed himself. 0:23:23.940 --> 0:23:25.899 And he, in fact, did live by that creed. He 0:23:25.940 --> 0:23:28.300 put all the chips on the table. More with doctor 0:23:28.300 --> 0:23:32.540 on coming up on the Hillsdale dialogue, all things hillsdale@hillsdale.edu. 0:23:32.859 --> 0:23:36.619 Stay tuned. Welcome back America. I'm Hugh Hewitt, we're talking 0:23:36.619 --> 0:23:39.379 about the French Navy with Doctor Larry Arnn, president of 0:23:39.380 --> 0:23:42.820 Hillsdale College, which is why he then goes on and 0:23:42.820 --> 0:23:47.380 he's very harshly critical of Admiral Darlan and very, uh, 0:23:47.420 --> 0:23:49.780 full of praise for de Gaulle. De Gaulle, he calls 0:23:49.780 --> 0:23:53.240 the Constable of France. It's a fine turn of phrase. 0:23:53.520 --> 0:23:56.520 He also says about Darlan. And he's such a beautiful writer. 0:23:56.840 --> 0:24:00.280 I had his great grandfather. Darlan is the admiral of 0:24:00.280 --> 0:24:03.120 the French Navy. His great grandfather had been killed at 0:24:03.119 --> 0:24:07.160 the Battle of Trafalgar. October 21st, 1805. So we're going 0:24:07.160 --> 0:24:10.280 back a long way from 1940, Churchill says. I therefore 0:24:10.320 --> 0:24:12.320 thought of him as one of those good Frenchmen who 0:24:12.320 --> 0:24:14.880 hate England, which is a fine turn of phrase, but 0:24:14.880 --> 0:24:19.399 it's a nice way to distinguish between French, who are 0:24:19.440 --> 0:24:22.960 who are defeatist and French, who just hate England. But 0:24:22.960 --> 0:24:26.320 he has to bomb, and I don't think many Americans 0:24:26.320 --> 0:24:30.040 know this now. Larry Arnn, the Brits had to destroy 0:24:30.040 --> 0:24:32.880 the French navy. They had to seize it wherever they 0:24:32.880 --> 0:24:36.159 could and scuttle it wherever they had to. It's really 0:24:36.200 --> 0:24:38.840 kind of a remarkable episode in history. 0:24:40.119 --> 0:24:43.560 Churchill was very reluctant to do that. Remember, the British 0:24:44.200 --> 0:24:47.520 Navy and the French Navy have been training in common 0:24:47.720 --> 0:24:56.419 for Since 1905, roughly. So there's no there's no British 0:24:56.460 --> 0:25:01.700 officer who doesn't know the French Navy and regard it 0:25:01.700 --> 0:25:05.260 as their closest ally, and now he's going to sink 0:25:05.300 --> 0:25:09.740 their ships. And Churchill tells in this book he tells 0:25:10.260 --> 0:25:13.980 the story in the in the French North African port 0:25:14.020 --> 0:25:17.180 of Oran is where the French navy went to under 0:25:17.180 --> 0:25:21.619 Darlan's orders. Churchill tells about the negotiations between. Is that 0:25:21.619 --> 0:25:24.060 in this chapter I'm kind of lost where we are now. 0:25:24.260 --> 0:25:24.859 Yes. 0:25:25.340 --> 0:25:28.900 Yeah. So it's in the book, um, he tells the 0:25:28.900 --> 0:25:32.900 story of the negotiations and the British commander comes and says, 0:25:34.460 --> 0:25:39.620 I need you to give us these ships or scuttle them. 0:25:40.540 --> 0:25:45.300 And the French, and it's very civil, their allies and 0:25:45.660 --> 0:25:52.000 they negotiate for several rounds, and the French admiral is 0:25:52.520 --> 0:25:57.439 conferring back. And then he tells him. Not going to 0:25:57.440 --> 0:26:02.000 do it. And the British says, we're going to sink 0:26:02.040 --> 0:26:07.280 your fleet. And they do. And that's a terrible thing. 0:26:07.359 --> 0:26:10.520 Churchill regretted it deeply. On the other hand, there's a 0:26:10.520 --> 0:26:12.800 lot of evidence that it had a big effect on 0:26:12.800 --> 0:26:17.600 Franklin Roosevelt because he remember in that thing we talked 0:26:17.600 --> 0:26:24.280 about where Roosevelt won't publish his statement. Well, he really couldn't, 0:26:24.560 --> 0:26:29.400 you know, because he, he he didn't have the authority 0:26:29.440 --> 0:26:33.600 to go to war. He didn't have the authority to help. 0:26:34.119 --> 0:26:38.879 But he's also hearing from the French. And the French 0:26:39.800 --> 0:26:43.280 don't sound like people are going to keep on. And 0:26:43.280 --> 0:26:48.359 they didn't. Right. And so when he sees Churchill and 0:26:48.420 --> 0:26:51.620 he later sent Harry Hopkins, who lived with Roosevelt in 0:26:51.619 --> 0:26:55.500 the white House for many years, very close to him 0:26:55.500 --> 0:26:57.620 when he sent him to talk to Churchill. And when 0:26:57.619 --> 0:27:01.139 he saw this destruction of the French fleet, he thought 0:27:01.180 --> 0:27:03.740 Churchill hinted that they were going to keep fighting. And 0:27:03.740 --> 0:27:07.859 therefore this is a enterprise we might invest in. 0:27:08.500 --> 0:27:12.660 Page 213 he writes, the elimination of the French navy had, 0:27:12.740 --> 0:27:16.100 as an important factor, almost at a single stroke by. 0:27:16.100 --> 0:27:21.220 Violent action produced a profound impression in every country. Here 0:27:21.220 --> 0:27:24.180 was this Britain, which had so many had counted down 0:27:24.180 --> 0:27:27.300 and out, which strangers had supposed to be quivering on 0:27:27.300 --> 0:27:30.419 the brink of surrender to a mighty power arrayed against her, 0:27:30.700 --> 0:27:35.460 striking ruthlessly at her dearest friends of yesterday, and securing 0:27:35.460 --> 0:27:38.740 for a while to herself the undisputed command of the sea. 0:27:39.100 --> 0:27:43.420 It was made plain that the British War Cabinet feared nothing, 0:27:43.619 --> 0:27:48.320 and would stop at nothing. This was true. He's right 0:27:48.320 --> 0:27:51.720 about that. If you kill all your friends, you're not 0:27:51.720 --> 0:27:53.639 going to. You're not going to stop. 0:27:54.960 --> 0:27:58.639 Yeah. Here we go. It, uh. You know, uh, I 0:27:58.680 --> 0:28:01.639 used to keep on my wall a war photograph of 0:28:01.640 --> 0:28:04.560 of Abraham Lincoln. And next to it, a war photograph 0:28:04.560 --> 0:28:07.920 of Winston Churchill. And beneath each of them quote. And 0:28:07.920 --> 0:28:11.160 the quote from Lincoln was, you don't fight wars by 0:28:11.200 --> 0:28:15.840 throwing by blowing rose water through elder stalk squirts. And 0:28:15.880 --> 0:28:18.399 the quote and the quote from Churchill is in the 0:28:18.400 --> 0:28:21.879 Canadian parliament. He in the middle of the war, he said, uh, 0:28:22.640 --> 0:28:25.840 we have not traveled all this way across the oceans, 0:28:25.960 --> 0:28:29.760 across the mountains, across the prairies, because we are made 0:28:29.760 --> 0:28:35.360 of sugar candy. And, uh, in other words, yeah, this 0:28:35.359 --> 0:28:38.840 guy is formidable. This guy is conquered Europe. We're not 0:28:38.840 --> 0:28:44.400 nothing either. And, uh, that is very important. After Alamein 0:28:44.800 --> 0:28:48.860 first really big land battle that the British one. Churchill 0:28:48.860 --> 0:28:51.460 celebrated that and said, you know, we know that our 0:28:51.460 --> 0:28:54.900 soldiers are prepared to die for their country. They can 0:28:54.900 --> 0:28:58.580 also kill for their country. And that, in other words, 0:29:00.340 --> 0:29:02.460 you're going to have to act like a winner if 0:29:02.460 --> 0:29:03.300 you're going to win. 0:29:03.980 --> 0:29:06.380 You do indeed have to act like a winner if 0:29:06.380 --> 0:29:08.700 you're going to win. Stay tuned. Doctor, I'll be right 0:29:08.700 --> 0:29:13.860 back after the break. All things hillsdale@hillsdale.edu, including their fabulous 0:29:13.860 --> 0:29:18.740 new course on the Odyssey. Welcome back America. I'm Hugh Hewitt. Doctor, 0:29:18.860 --> 0:29:21.060 we're about to talk about the rhetoric that is used 0:29:21.060 --> 0:29:25.620 deployed by Churchill. Well the the ability of his to 0:29:25.660 --> 0:29:30.420 message is really quite extraordinary. Uh, the gift of rhetorical flourish. 0:29:31.220 --> 0:29:35.780 Boy it's rare. FDR had it. Reagan had it. I 0:29:35.780 --> 0:29:39.660 think President Trump sometimes has it in conversation, but not 0:29:39.660 --> 0:29:42.420 in set piece rhetoric. Do you disagree with that? He's 0:29:42.420 --> 0:29:43.980 not a set piece, rhetorician. 0:29:45.140 --> 0:29:49.520 Yeah. Churchill. That's right. Churchill is, uh, I mean, there 0:29:49.560 --> 0:29:53.720 Churchill prepared everything, right? But he prepared it. But then 0:29:53.720 --> 0:29:56.920 in addition, there are these many times when he just 0:29:57.080 --> 0:30:01.240 waxed eloquent, like, here's a phrase that I liked. He 0:30:01.240 --> 0:30:05.600 writes to some of his colleagues. I really think that you, 0:30:05.640 --> 0:30:09.240 Lloyd and Amory, ought to be able to lift our 0:30:09.240 --> 0:30:12.160 affairs in the East and Middle East out of the 0:30:12.160 --> 0:30:17.719 catalepsy by which they are smitten. Who writes that? You know. 0:30:19.440 --> 0:30:22.320 Last thing I want to mention this week he writes 0:30:22.320 --> 0:30:26.280 to Smuts. A day or two weeks after his finest hour, 0:30:26.560 --> 0:30:30.040 Smuts is running South Africa. If Hitler fails to beat 0:30:30.040 --> 0:30:34.000 us here, he will probably recoil eastwards. Indeed, he may 0:30:34.000 --> 0:30:37.200 do this even without trying invasion. I just wanted to 0:30:37.200 --> 0:30:41.320 point out he's a brilliant man. He's forecasting the future 0:30:41.320 --> 0:30:44.600 in their darkest hour might be their finest hour, but 0:30:44.600 --> 0:30:47.260 he's saying, you know what? If he doesn't get this island? 0:30:47.300 --> 0:30:49.940 He's going to attack Stalin. And he's exactly right. 0:30:50.260 --> 0:30:54.100 So the. So this chapter ends. I'm going I'm going 0:30:54.100 --> 0:30:57.540 to go find it. The sentence really great. I can't 0:30:57.540 --> 0:31:00.500 find it, but it's. And it would all come to 0:31:00.540 --> 0:31:02.780 be just what he predicted. 0:31:05.100 --> 0:31:07.540 All right. We will come back next week to talk 0:31:07.620 --> 0:31:12.740 to Winston Churchill's. A remarkable gift of prophecy and rhetorical skill, 0:31:12.780 --> 0:31:15.700 but most importantly of statesmanship. Doctor Oren, thank you. 0:31:19.860 --> 0:31:23.060 Thanks for listening to the Hillsdale Dialogues, part of the 0:31:23.060 --> 0:31:31.740 Hillsdale College Podcast Network. More episodes@podcast.hillsdale.edu or wherever you find 0:31:31.740 --> 0:31:37.860 your audio. For more information about Hillsdale College, head to hillsdale.edu.