1 00:00:21,623 --> 00:00:25,433 S1: In this standalone episode, I speak with Jason Miller. Jason 2 00:00:25,433 --> 00:00:29,893 S1: is the founder of collide. A company recently acquired by 3 00:00:29,893 --> 00:00:34,423 S1: One Password. And in this conversation we discuss collides acquisition 4 00:00:34,423 --> 00:00:38,713 S1: by one password. The synergy between collide and One Password. 5 00:00:39,703 --> 00:00:43,483 S1: The challenge of password management. The concept of device trust 6 00:00:43,483 --> 00:00:48,853 S1: and zero trust. The limitations of current MDM solutions. Engaging 7 00:00:48,853 --> 00:00:53,743 S1: end users and security remediation. The philosophy behind collides approach. 8 00:00:54,073 --> 00:00:58,123 S1: The importance of human friendly security solutions. Future plans for 9 00:00:58,123 --> 00:01:03,103 S1: collide and the potential for broader application of collides technology. 10 00:01:03,463 --> 00:01:11,253 S1: And with that, here's our conversation with Jason Miller. All right, Jason, 11 00:01:11,253 --> 00:01:12,903 S1: welcome to unsupervised Learning. 12 00:01:14,103 --> 00:01:15,153 S2: Thanks for having me. 13 00:01:16,473 --> 00:01:19,203 S1: Yeah. So I understand you've had some big news in 14 00:01:19,203 --> 00:01:20,253 S1: recent weeks. 15 00:01:21,903 --> 00:01:26,043 S2: Yeah. Yeah, it's been a whirlwind. Uh, as I think 16 00:01:26,193 --> 00:01:28,983 S2: some some folks have found out, we've been acquired by 17 00:01:28,983 --> 00:01:31,743 S2: one password. We announced that a few weeks ago at 18 00:01:31,743 --> 00:01:34,683 S2: the time of this recording, and, um, it was a 19 00:01:34,683 --> 00:01:36,873 S2: really big deal. Uh, it's something that we've been working 20 00:01:36,873 --> 00:01:39,453 S2: on with them for a while and discussions, and it 21 00:01:39,453 --> 00:01:42,903 S2: was awesome to finally be able to talk about it publicly. 22 00:01:42,903 --> 00:01:48,183 S2: But I've always loved the one password product. I got 23 00:01:48,183 --> 00:01:50,883 S2: to meet a lot of the folks who lead the 24 00:01:50,883 --> 00:01:56,403 S2: company there, including the original founders. And, uh, they're incredible. 25 00:01:56,403 --> 00:01:58,743 S2: They're just as good as the product that they sell. 26 00:01:59,013 --> 00:02:01,053 S2: And that was really important to me, because some of 27 00:02:01,053 --> 00:02:05,883 S2: the foundational elements of collide was around treating end users 28 00:02:05,883 --> 00:02:09,963 S2: with respect, honesty, getting in front of end users and 29 00:02:09,963 --> 00:02:14,393 S2: giving them. Under an understanding of what's wrong with their device. 30 00:02:14,393 --> 00:02:16,673 S2: Will they do the same thing? But they focused on 31 00:02:16,673 --> 00:02:20,843 S2: probably even the harder problem than we solve is what 32 00:02:20,843 --> 00:02:22,763 S2: do you do about passwords? How do you keep yourself 33 00:02:22,763 --> 00:02:26,243 S2: safe with all these different logins to all these different apps? 34 00:02:26,513 --> 00:02:29,063 S2: They've solved that so well that it's been ubiquitous like 35 00:02:29,063 --> 00:02:31,733 S2: everybody uses it. And that was always a goal for 36 00:02:31,733 --> 00:02:34,283 S2: me at Callide is to achieve the same thing. But 37 00:02:34,283 --> 00:02:36,533 S2: on the in the device trust space and for end 38 00:02:36,533 --> 00:02:40,013 S2: user driven remediation. And so for us, like culturally the 39 00:02:40,013 --> 00:02:44,513 S2: fit was perfect. And it's great for me because we 40 00:02:44,513 --> 00:02:47,873 S2: get a lot of opportunity to still grow and what 41 00:02:47,873 --> 00:02:49,523 S2: we're doing at Callide. But now we have a lot 42 00:02:49,523 --> 00:02:52,073 S2: more resources, and that would have had to have come 43 00:02:52,073 --> 00:02:54,983 S2: through the form of venture capital and a number of 44 00:02:54,983 --> 00:02:58,703 S2: other things, and the incentives can sometimes get misaligned. Really 45 00:02:58,703 --> 00:03:01,373 S2: confident that with one password, we're going to be able 46 00:03:01,373 --> 00:03:04,523 S2: to continue our mission, achieve it at a much faster 47 00:03:04,523 --> 00:03:08,603 S2: pace and keep what was core about us, our DNA, 48 00:03:08,603 --> 00:03:10,523 S2: the same because they're that way too. 49 00:03:11,213 --> 00:03:13,943 S1: Yeah. That's great. So so talk about some of that synergy. 50 00:03:13,943 --> 00:03:17,513 S1: Like how did this, uh what do you think they 51 00:03:17,513 --> 00:03:20,453 S1: saw in you? Obviously we think it's a great product, 52 00:03:20,453 --> 00:03:23,183 S1: but like the different spaces, a lot of people might 53 00:03:23,183 --> 00:03:25,883 S1: be like, wait a minute, which space is one password? 54 00:03:25,883 --> 00:03:28,643 S1: Which space is Callide? How do you how do you 55 00:03:28,643 --> 00:03:31,373 S1: see that merging both when you first heard about it 56 00:03:31,373 --> 00:03:34,313 S1: and then also now like as you actually implement it? 57 00:03:35,513 --> 00:03:38,783 S2: Yeah. I think to understand why one password likes collide. 58 00:03:38,783 --> 00:03:43,703 S2: It's not about necessarily product or feature synergy. We're in 59 00:03:43,703 --> 00:03:46,973 S2: different areas. And the thing that makes sense to them 60 00:03:46,973 --> 00:03:49,343 S2: is like the way that one password sees themselves after 61 00:03:49,343 --> 00:03:53,303 S2: talking with them, they really see themselves as a company 62 00:03:53,303 --> 00:03:56,843 S2: that is distilling down a really hard topic to, you know, 63 00:03:56,843 --> 00:03:59,123 S2: a hard problem to solve. And in their case, that's 64 00:03:59,243 --> 00:04:04,853 S2: password management and making it something that is easily solved 65 00:04:04,853 --> 00:04:08,453 S2: through software and technology, and distilling it down to a 66 00:04:08,453 --> 00:04:13,823 S2: level of simplicity that even my mom could figure out, right? 67 00:04:13,853 --> 00:04:18,083 S2: I mean, before there were password managers, there really weren't. 68 00:04:18,383 --> 00:04:20,453 S2: There was a lot of recommendations on what you're supposed 69 00:04:20,453 --> 00:04:23,393 S2: to do to do a good job, to keep yourself safe. 70 00:04:23,393 --> 00:04:25,883 S2: From a password perspective, you're not supposed to reuse passwords. 71 00:04:25,883 --> 00:04:28,313 S2: You need to have a certain level of complexity. So 72 00:04:28,313 --> 00:04:30,623 S2: we're doing a lot of talking as security practitioners and 73 00:04:30,623 --> 00:04:34,643 S2: telling people what they need to be doing. But we 74 00:04:34,643 --> 00:04:37,673 S2: weren't giving them any tools to really effectively put those 75 00:04:37,673 --> 00:04:40,553 S2: things into practice. And that's what one password was able 76 00:04:40,553 --> 00:04:43,253 S2: to do. On the Callide side, we have a very 77 00:04:43,253 --> 00:04:45,383 S2: similar challenge in front of us. We have a lot 78 00:04:45,383 --> 00:04:47,993 S2: of IT and security practitioners to tell end users all 79 00:04:47,993 --> 00:04:50,783 S2: the time, hey, you got to keep your OS up 80 00:04:50,783 --> 00:04:53,843 S2: to date. You need to have disk encryption enabled. You 81 00:04:53,843 --> 00:04:57,443 S2: need to have system integrity protection on the browsers need 82 00:04:57,443 --> 00:04:58,763 S2: to be up to date. You need to do this. 83 00:04:58,763 --> 00:05:01,673 S2: You need to do that. And today the tools that 84 00:05:01,673 --> 00:05:05,693 S2: we have to help users solve those problems don't work 85 00:05:05,693 --> 00:05:10,223 S2: very well. We have MDM. Most of Clyde's customers use MDM, 86 00:05:10,553 --> 00:05:12,713 S2: but it has a flaw. And that flaw is it 87 00:05:12,713 --> 00:05:17,003 S2: only can work on the devices that it's installed on. 88 00:05:17,243 --> 00:05:21,353 S2: And there's nothing that really stops people from signing into 89 00:05:21,353 --> 00:05:27,143 S2: your most important apps with their personal devices. Right? You 90 00:05:27,143 --> 00:05:30,263 S2: need to have something in place that says, hey, these 91 00:05:30,263 --> 00:05:32,723 S2: are the rules of the road. You're going to either 92 00:05:32,723 --> 00:05:36,383 S2: have a device that's managed under MDM or in addition 93 00:05:36,383 --> 00:05:39,473 S2: to that, or alternatively, you're going to meet these basic 94 00:05:39,473 --> 00:05:43,583 S2: security requirements before you can get on AWS, before you 95 00:05:43,583 --> 00:05:46,913 S2: can get on GitHub, before you can get on Salesforce, like, 96 00:05:46,913 --> 00:05:49,373 S2: these are the core apps that we have that sensitive 97 00:05:49,373 --> 00:05:51,743 S2: data in them. You need to be on a computer 98 00:05:51,743 --> 00:05:55,103 S2: that's safe. Well, there's no real good answer to that. 99 00:05:55,103 --> 00:05:59,933 S2: And Callide has found the beginnings of that solution for 100 00:05:59,933 --> 00:06:04,433 S2: folks who have Okta. And our plan is to make 101 00:06:04,433 --> 00:06:07,793 S2: that as ubiquitous as the one password password manager is 102 00:06:07,793 --> 00:06:10,793 S2: for passwords. We want to be that solution for solving 103 00:06:10,793 --> 00:06:12,563 S2: that problem for devices. 104 00:06:13,223 --> 00:06:15,413 S1: Yeah, that makes a lot of sense. I heard someone 105 00:06:15,413 --> 00:06:18,923 S1: describe business strategy in an interesting way before they said, 106 00:06:18,923 --> 00:06:22,883 S1: look for a really acute problem that's just so annoying 107 00:06:22,883 --> 00:06:26,813 S1: for people, and just solve it more elegantly and better 108 00:06:26,813 --> 00:06:30,503 S1: than anyone else. And both of the two problems that 109 00:06:30,503 --> 00:06:32,813 S1: that you described, they very much fit that. 110 00:06:33,813 --> 00:06:36,483 S2: That's exactly right. And that's why I think one pastor 111 00:06:36,483 --> 00:06:39,963 S2: has enjoyed so much success is sound like they have some. 112 00:06:40,263 --> 00:06:42,993 S2: They have a really great people there. But let's be clear, 113 00:06:42,993 --> 00:06:45,633 S2: the reason why they're so successful is they've built an 114 00:06:45,633 --> 00:06:48,933 S2: incredible product that solves a real problem that people have. 115 00:06:49,703 --> 00:06:54,083 S2: That's hard to do in the security space because first, 116 00:06:54,083 --> 00:06:56,723 S2: it's really hard to get people to even recognize there 117 00:06:56,723 --> 00:06:59,423 S2: is a problem. So like in colliders case, the thing 118 00:06:59,423 --> 00:07:01,613 S2: that we battle all the time, and one of the 119 00:07:01,613 --> 00:07:04,073 S2: reasons I even come on podcast to talk about it 120 00:07:04,583 --> 00:07:10,013 S2: is people don't necessarily recognize that it's bad that any 121 00:07:10,013 --> 00:07:14,873 S2: device can sign in to most of your apps, including 122 00:07:14,873 --> 00:07:19,583 S2: the devices that are not under management. And that's universally 123 00:07:19,583 --> 00:07:22,673 S2: true in a lot of organizations today. Device trust and 124 00:07:22,673 --> 00:07:25,913 S2: zero trust is concepts are new. Yeah, only a few 125 00:07:25,913 --> 00:07:28,583 S2: years old and the concepts are older. But the products 126 00:07:28,583 --> 00:07:31,703 S2: that actually create the outcomes people are looking for a 127 00:07:31,703 --> 00:07:34,973 S2: really new. And so most organizations are in a state 128 00:07:34,973 --> 00:07:37,763 S2: right now where yes, they have MDM, they have all 129 00:07:37,763 --> 00:07:43,353 S2: these things, but they're not actually. They haven't created a 130 00:07:43,353 --> 00:07:47,523 S2: protective layer that actually ensures that devices are in a 131 00:07:47,523 --> 00:07:52,593 S2: basic state. So a basic state of security. So fundamentally 132 00:07:52,593 --> 00:07:57,813 S2: we collide. Uh, we're solving that problem, and we're trying 133 00:07:57,813 --> 00:08:00,153 S2: to solve it in the most elegant way possible. That 134 00:08:00,153 --> 00:08:03,783 S2: still preserves the cultures of these companies, like a lot 135 00:08:03,783 --> 00:08:08,613 S2: of companies allow a pretty broad BYoD program, or they 136 00:08:08,613 --> 00:08:14,163 S2: have contractors that don't use company provision devices, and they 137 00:08:14,163 --> 00:08:17,793 S2: want to preserve that cultural element of their company, but 138 00:08:17,793 --> 00:08:21,123 S2: they want to have some semblance of security. Well, what 139 00:08:21,123 --> 00:08:23,613 S2: is the state of the what can you purchase today 140 00:08:23,613 --> 00:08:26,853 S2: to ensure that happens? There really isn't a lot out there. 141 00:08:26,883 --> 00:08:29,223 S2: A lot of the zero trust device trust solutions that 142 00:08:29,223 --> 00:08:33,663 S2: exist on the market today. Implicitly assume that the way 143 00:08:33,663 --> 00:08:36,123 S2: that you're going to decide whether a device should be 144 00:08:36,123 --> 00:08:39,513 S2: signing in or not is whether it's enrolled on the MDM. 145 00:08:39,573 --> 00:08:43,023 S2: But if you have a big BYoD program, end users 146 00:08:43,023 --> 00:08:45,393 S2: aren't going to want to enroll their devices in the MDM, 147 00:08:45,393 --> 00:08:47,553 S2: or nor is it really appropriate for them to be 148 00:08:47,553 --> 00:08:51,333 S2: doing that in some cases. Or contractors, they may be 149 00:08:51,333 --> 00:08:54,453 S2: on their own MDM and they're not on yours. And 150 00:08:54,453 --> 00:08:56,403 S2: a lot of the solutions out there just don't work 151 00:08:56,403 --> 00:08:59,403 S2: in that world. We've sort of distilled it down beyond that. 152 00:08:59,403 --> 00:09:02,013 S2: The thing, the key insight that Callide has had is 153 00:09:02,493 --> 00:09:05,553 S2: you can't assume that a device is in a good 154 00:09:05,553 --> 00:09:08,793 S2: state just because it's on the MDM anyway. So let's 155 00:09:08,793 --> 00:09:11,913 S2: just start at first principles. Yeah. What is the disk 156 00:09:11,913 --> 00:09:15,633 S2: encryption story? What is the OS version? How long has 157 00:09:15,633 --> 00:09:18,753 S2: it been since the the device has been rebooted. So 158 00:09:18,753 --> 00:09:20,643 S2: on and so forth. And you can run hundreds of 159 00:09:20,643 --> 00:09:24,483 S2: different checks. Let's just look at those at a baseline level. 160 00:09:24,483 --> 00:09:27,693 S2: Not even thinking about the MDM. And and if they're 161 00:09:27,693 --> 00:09:29,973 S2: not in that state then they don't get on. But 162 00:09:29,973 --> 00:09:34,203 S2: more importantly, we can engage with the end user to 163 00:09:34,203 --> 00:09:38,163 S2: get them to fix those problems while they are being 164 00:09:38,163 --> 00:09:41,193 S2: informed that they're blocked from being signing in. And that's 165 00:09:41,193 --> 00:09:45,033 S2: the key. And that's why this type of solution is 166 00:09:45,033 --> 00:09:48,033 S2: so important, because it will work on anything. Like we 167 00:09:48,033 --> 00:09:51,483 S2: support Linux, you have mobile devices. The reason why we 168 00:09:51,483 --> 00:09:54,423 S2: can do that is we don't need a special API 169 00:09:54,423 --> 00:09:57,003 S2: to fix the problems. The interface to fix the problems 170 00:09:57,003 --> 00:09:59,583 S2: is the person sitting behind the computer. Yeah. And if 171 00:09:59,583 --> 00:10:02,523 S2: you embrace that and you make it so that they 172 00:10:02,523 --> 00:10:05,013 S2: understand and they have the motivation and the tools to 173 00:10:05,013 --> 00:10:07,893 S2: do it, they can solve any problem. Even the most 174 00:10:07,893 --> 00:10:12,543 S2: nuanced security issues your organization is trying to solve today 175 00:10:12,543 --> 00:10:15,483 S2: and users can fix for you and with perfect efficacy 176 00:10:15,483 --> 00:10:16,953 S2: if you do this the right way. 177 00:10:17,853 --> 00:10:18,573 S3: Yeah. 178 00:10:19,293 --> 00:10:22,323 S1: Yeah, that makes sense. It's actually interesting. I mean, that 179 00:10:22,323 --> 00:10:26,913 S1: zero trust story really, really does resonate because it's like 180 00:10:27,633 --> 00:10:30,513 S1: you're falling back and saying, look, this MDM thing, it 181 00:10:30,513 --> 00:10:33,303 S1: hasn't worked out that perfectly. And you're dealing with the 182 00:10:33,303 --> 00:10:37,563 S1: reality that is, which is the business hands out laptops 183 00:10:37,563 --> 00:10:41,133 S1: to people and says go to work like that just happens. 184 00:10:41,223 --> 00:10:44,193 S1: And then when security is like, well, you don't have 185 00:10:44,193 --> 00:10:47,343 S1: the MDM, we can't let you on. Like we're literally 186 00:10:47,343 --> 00:10:48,453 S1: stopping business. 187 00:10:49,483 --> 00:10:53,533 S2: Right? Yeah. And it's a concern. Well, what's interesting is that. 188 00:10:54,503 --> 00:10:56,873 S2: The companies don't really have good tools today to measure 189 00:10:56,873 --> 00:11:02,113 S2: how effective. Their device program. So let's say you don't 190 00:11:02,113 --> 00:11:06,223 S2: have a zero trust or device trust solution today. And 191 00:11:06,223 --> 00:11:09,193 S2: you're trying to understand is that even important? Well, the 192 00:11:09,193 --> 00:11:11,203 S2: first thing that you need to do is you need 193 00:11:11,203 --> 00:11:13,603 S2: to at least cast a net and understand who, what 194 00:11:13,603 --> 00:11:17,983 S2: devices are even signing into apps. Yeah. And that is 195 00:11:17,983 --> 00:11:20,113 S2: that there really isn't an answer to how to solve 196 00:11:20,113 --> 00:11:21,913 S2: that today. You know, that's one of the things I'm 197 00:11:21,913 --> 00:11:24,493 S2: working with on the one password side is can we 198 00:11:24,493 --> 00:11:28,873 S2: actually help capture that? But let's say that report did exist. 199 00:11:28,873 --> 00:11:31,153 S2: Let's say I could give you a report today for 200 00:11:31,153 --> 00:11:34,723 S2: your business. That said, here's all the devices that we saw. 201 00:11:34,723 --> 00:11:38,293 S2: Log in to this app and here's their state. Without 202 00:11:38,293 --> 00:11:40,183 S2: deploying an agent or anything like that, let's just say 203 00:11:40,183 --> 00:11:43,813 S2: that report exists. I think the challenge is that you're 204 00:11:43,813 --> 00:11:45,763 S2: going to see a lot of things. You're going to see, hey, 205 00:11:45,763 --> 00:11:47,593 S2: a lot of these some of these devices aren't on 206 00:11:47,593 --> 00:11:51,673 S2: any MDM. Some of these devices don't have any disk encryption. 207 00:11:51,673 --> 00:11:54,223 S2: Like they just file Vault is off if it's Mac 208 00:11:54,223 --> 00:11:58,543 S2: or BitLocker is off if it's windows. Here's a bunch 209 00:11:58,543 --> 00:12:03,463 S2: that have like an OS version that's three years old. 210 00:12:03,463 --> 00:12:07,663 S2: Four years old. Yeah. Probably exploitable remotely easily by any 211 00:12:07,663 --> 00:12:10,303 S2: drive by malware that could go to the wrong website 212 00:12:10,303 --> 00:12:13,573 S2: and you're popped. You would see a report that says that. 213 00:12:13,573 --> 00:12:18,013 S2: And then the key insight is, after seeing this report, 214 00:12:18,013 --> 00:12:20,863 S2: what do you want to reach for to solve that problem? 215 00:12:20,863 --> 00:12:23,803 S2: And I think what a lot of folks naturally reach 216 00:12:23,803 --> 00:12:27,523 S2: for is, oh, we need more MDM. Well, no, not 217 00:12:27,523 --> 00:12:31,633 S2: really either. You already have MDM and that's not clearly 218 00:12:31,633 --> 00:12:35,113 S2: not working. We've captured a bunch of devices here that 219 00:12:35,113 --> 00:12:36,943 S2: are being used to do real work that aren't on 220 00:12:36,943 --> 00:12:41,803 S2: the MDM. So now that's not working that program. And 221 00:12:41,803 --> 00:12:45,763 S2: the other thing is. You don't have any way of 222 00:12:45,763 --> 00:12:50,653 S2: even effectively measuring the security of these devices outside of 223 00:12:50,653 --> 00:12:53,143 S2: the MDM. So the right thing to reach for isn't 224 00:12:53,143 --> 00:12:57,523 S2: an MDM. In that case, it's to reach for device trust. 225 00:12:57,523 --> 00:13:01,273 S2: It's to say, hey, let's say I have Okta. Let's 226 00:13:01,273 --> 00:13:05,743 S2: figure out a way during the Okta authentication flow to 227 00:13:05,743 --> 00:13:08,293 S2: vet a device. Let's figure out what's going on with 228 00:13:08,293 --> 00:13:12,403 S2: it and then let's. Not let it in if it's 229 00:13:12,403 --> 00:13:15,613 S2: not in the right state, but not block work. As 230 00:13:15,613 --> 00:13:18,433 S2: you said, let's actually give that person who is being 231 00:13:18,433 --> 00:13:21,943 S2: blocked a path to redemption. How do they get their 232 00:13:21,943 --> 00:13:24,793 S2: device in the right state? And they'll be highly motivated 233 00:13:24,793 --> 00:13:26,533 S2: to do that because they want to go and get 234 00:13:26,533 --> 00:13:29,383 S2: to work. And then how do you get the nuances 235 00:13:29,383 --> 00:13:32,203 S2: of that interaction? Right? Like maybe it doesn't start off 236 00:13:32,203 --> 00:13:34,213 S2: with a block. It starts off with a warning and 237 00:13:34,213 --> 00:13:37,333 S2: you have 14 days. Or maybe it's not even a 238 00:13:37,333 --> 00:13:40,663 S2: warning with a consequences. It's just an FYI like, hey, 239 00:13:40,663 --> 00:13:43,483 S2: we're gonna, in the future, be rolling out this program. 240 00:13:43,483 --> 00:13:47,863 S2: If it were to have been implemented today, you probably 241 00:13:47,863 --> 00:13:50,503 S2: wouldn't have met the bar. You may want to start 242 00:13:50,503 --> 00:13:53,353 S2: thinking about that and then graduate to an explicit warning 243 00:13:53,353 --> 00:13:56,863 S2: with a time deadline to then eventually to a block. 244 00:13:56,863 --> 00:13:59,743 S2: And maybe even when they're blocked, you don't. You give 245 00:13:59,743 --> 00:14:03,403 S2: them one more snooze, right? And then they can still 246 00:14:03,403 --> 00:14:05,143 S2: get it if it's an emergency. So those are like 247 00:14:05,143 --> 00:14:08,053 S2: the types of human elements that we've built into the 248 00:14:08,053 --> 00:14:11,233 S2: collide platform, because now we've been running this app, we've 249 00:14:11,233 --> 00:14:12,883 S2: been selling this product for about a year. We're going 250 00:14:12,883 --> 00:14:15,493 S2: to continue to sell it at one password. And we've 251 00:14:15,493 --> 00:14:17,923 S2: learned a lot about how end users react to these 252 00:14:17,923 --> 00:14:21,463 S2: types of screens. And it's been incredibly effective, like all 253 00:14:21,463 --> 00:14:25,753 S2: of our customers today have essentially been able to achieve 254 00:14:25,753 --> 00:14:29,953 S2: perfect compliance and anything that they want by utilizing this mechanism, 255 00:14:29,953 --> 00:14:32,293 S2: which has been fantastic to see. 256 00:14:32,773 --> 00:14:36,343 S1: Yeah, I love the fact that it's enabling business to happen. 257 00:14:36,463 --> 00:14:39,763 S1: I also love the fact that you're using the best 258 00:14:39,763 --> 00:14:44,083 S1: possible resource for remediation, which everyone has been hesitant to do, 259 00:14:44,083 --> 00:14:46,963 S1: which is the person actually using the computer, and you're 260 00:14:46,963 --> 00:14:50,443 S1: sort of guiding them. And it's like, you know what 261 00:14:50,443 --> 00:14:53,323 S1: this reminds me of? And hopefully this isn't offensive in 262 00:14:53,323 --> 00:14:57,823 S1: any way. But, um, I've been like kind of marveling 263 00:14:57,823 --> 00:15:02,833 S1: at calendly. Yes. So it's like, okay, wait a minute. 264 00:15:02,833 --> 00:15:06,343 S1: What are you doing exactly? Like, how bad was this 265 00:15:06,343 --> 00:15:12,253 S1: problem before? Billions of people probably suffering from a problem that, 266 00:15:12,253 --> 00:15:16,123 S1: like the big tech scene has not solved, and someone 267 00:15:16,123 --> 00:15:22,153 S1: comes in and cleanly and, like, elegantly solves this one thing. 268 00:15:22,393 --> 00:15:25,543 S1: It's like what? In their case, it's like, how do 269 00:15:25,543 --> 00:15:28,423 S1: you share calendars? Okay, they make this one thing. It 270 00:15:28,423 --> 00:15:32,143 S1: doesn't do that much and it's amazing. And now everyone 271 00:15:32,143 --> 00:15:35,143 S1: uses it. And guess what? When the bigger people try 272 00:15:35,143 --> 00:15:39,313 S1: to compete, they cram all this extra stuff. They actually 273 00:15:39,313 --> 00:15:42,433 S1: miss the point of the app and end up making 274 00:15:42,433 --> 00:15:45,283 S1: something inferior. Even though they have a much larger team, 275 00:15:45,733 --> 00:15:48,613 S1: it's because they miss the philosophy of it, and I 276 00:15:48,613 --> 00:15:52,723 S1: feel like the collide product basically really understood the problem 277 00:15:52,723 --> 00:15:56,533 S1: and really understood not to over engineer the solution and 278 00:15:56,533 --> 00:15:59,983 S1: to kind of just make it as as clean as 279 00:15:59,983 --> 00:16:01,003 S1: it needed to be. 280 00:16:02,193 --> 00:16:04,983 S2: Yeah. And I think ultimately the reason why we were 281 00:16:04,983 --> 00:16:08,793 S2: able to see that problem isn't because, like, we're clairvoyant 282 00:16:08,793 --> 00:16:12,243 S2: or we understand it. I think we started off looking 283 00:16:12,243 --> 00:16:17,103 S2: to solve like fundamentally, I don't think that the existing 284 00:16:17,103 --> 00:16:21,483 S2: security solutions on the market are very human being friendly. Yeah. 285 00:16:21,483 --> 00:16:24,933 S2: And I wanted to build a security company that had 286 00:16:24,933 --> 00:16:27,243 S2: that as a core principle. So we were sort of 287 00:16:27,243 --> 00:16:29,493 S2: we knew that was an immutable part of collide. How 288 00:16:29,493 --> 00:16:32,193 S2: do we build something on top of that? The second 289 00:16:32,193 --> 00:16:34,803 S2: thing that is part of my DNA that sort of 290 00:16:34,803 --> 00:16:39,213 S2: informed this was I worked in manufacturing as a couple 291 00:16:39,213 --> 00:16:41,943 S2: of first jobs that I had and like, you know, 292 00:16:41,943 --> 00:16:44,523 S2: actually on the machine shop floor. And a big part 293 00:16:44,523 --> 00:16:48,873 S2: of that experience was safety training. And I remember, like 294 00:16:48,873 --> 00:16:53,013 S2: sitting down, you're getting the orientation. It's like making sure 295 00:16:53,013 --> 00:16:56,043 S2: that you're being aware of your surroundings and like, but 296 00:16:56,043 --> 00:16:58,053 S2: you learn about some of these systems that were put 297 00:16:58,053 --> 00:17:02,253 S2: in place and every single. Safety law and process is 298 00:17:02,253 --> 00:17:05,673 S2: written in blood, right? Like people died. And then they 299 00:17:05,673 --> 00:17:07,713 S2: figured out a way to stop that from happening. And 300 00:17:07,713 --> 00:17:09,693 S2: the one that really stuck out to me was this 301 00:17:09,693 --> 00:17:13,983 S2: concept of lock out tag out. So for the folks 302 00:17:13,983 --> 00:17:16,413 S2: who are not familiar with this, let's say you have 303 00:17:16,413 --> 00:17:20,043 S2: a really dangerous piece of equipment on the shop floor. 304 00:17:20,683 --> 00:17:24,793 S2: And someone needs to repair it. Well, previously before lock 305 00:17:24,793 --> 00:17:27,313 S2: out tag out, what would happen is that person would 306 00:17:27,313 --> 00:17:29,203 S2: climb and they would turn off the machine. They would 307 00:17:29,203 --> 00:17:32,023 S2: climb into it, and they'd probably tell everybody, hey, don't 308 00:17:32,023 --> 00:17:34,213 S2: use this machine because I'm going to be fixing it. 309 00:17:34,303 --> 00:17:36,673 S2: And then they'd repair it. And then what would happen 310 00:17:36,673 --> 00:17:39,403 S2: every once in a while is someone wouldn't realize someone 311 00:17:39,403 --> 00:17:42,193 S2: was in the machine. They would turn it on, and 312 00:17:42,193 --> 00:17:45,613 S2: then that person inside the machine would die. So that 313 00:17:45,613 --> 00:17:49,543 S2: was really bad outcome, obviously. And the problem was, is like, 314 00:17:49,543 --> 00:17:53,023 S2: no matter how much training you gave to be like, 315 00:17:53,023 --> 00:17:55,153 S2: always check inside the machine. 316 00:17:55,153 --> 00:17:55,603 S3: Yeah. 317 00:17:55,783 --> 00:18:00,313 S2: People were still dying. So the right solution wasn't more training. 318 00:18:00,313 --> 00:18:03,523 S2: And to give them more PowerPoints or more manuals or 319 00:18:03,523 --> 00:18:08,713 S2: scary videos, it was to actually engineer a system that 320 00:18:08,713 --> 00:18:12,313 S2: would hack around the fallibility of human beings and actually 321 00:18:12,313 --> 00:18:14,833 S2: solve it for good. Yeah. So the way lockout tag 322 00:18:14,953 --> 00:18:17,113 S2: works is when that same person is going to decide 323 00:18:17,113 --> 00:18:20,983 S2: to repair the machine, they actually go up to the 324 00:18:20,983 --> 00:18:23,893 S2: control panel and they lock out the controls, and they 325 00:18:23,893 --> 00:18:26,593 S2: take the key that is used to lock out the 326 00:18:26,593 --> 00:18:29,743 S2: controls with them, so that if anyone even tries to 327 00:18:29,743 --> 00:18:32,623 S2: turn on the machine, they can't do it because they 328 00:18:32,623 --> 00:18:34,903 S2: don't have the key to unlock the controls. It's with 329 00:18:34,903 --> 00:18:38,743 S2: the person. Yeah, who's physically repairing the machine. And that 330 00:18:38,743 --> 00:18:44,783 S2: one simple trick. Effectively eliminated that whole class of deaths 331 00:18:44,783 --> 00:18:48,653 S2: in on a machine shop floor. Well, I feel that 332 00:18:48,653 --> 00:18:51,653 S2: the problems that we face in the security space about 333 00:18:51,653 --> 00:18:53,813 S2: getting human beings to do things we're still stuck in, 334 00:18:53,813 --> 00:18:58,433 S2: like the old. 1920s and 1930s Industrial Revolution phase of 335 00:18:58,433 --> 00:19:00,503 S2: it where we're trying to we know that we need 336 00:19:00,503 --> 00:19:02,873 S2: to get end users to know how to do things. 337 00:19:02,873 --> 00:19:06,023 S2: But the the instruments that we're wielding today are all 338 00:19:06,023 --> 00:19:10,193 S2: training videos, you know, yelling at people when they're not 339 00:19:10,193 --> 00:19:14,753 S2: doing things right, adding MDM. But we really need human 340 00:19:14,753 --> 00:19:18,653 S2: based systems that understand human psychology. They understand how people operate. 341 00:19:18,653 --> 00:19:23,743 S2: They understand that. People need systems that will prevent the 342 00:19:23,743 --> 00:19:26,293 S2: thing from happening entirely. And that's what Callide is. I 343 00:19:26,293 --> 00:19:29,143 S2: think it's the first product on the market that takes 344 00:19:29,143 --> 00:19:33,253 S2: lessons learned from those safety industries, and then brings them 345 00:19:33,253 --> 00:19:36,973 S2: in to the world of cyber security and gets end 346 00:19:36,973 --> 00:19:41,953 S2: users at scale with almost perfect efficacy to solve problems. 347 00:19:41,953 --> 00:19:44,743 S2: And that's what we've built. And that's why one password 348 00:19:44,743 --> 00:19:47,773 S2: was really excited about what we're doing, because they see 349 00:19:47,773 --> 00:19:51,463 S2: their systems. And the way that they arrived with their 350 00:19:51,463 --> 00:19:54,013 S2: answers is very similar methodology. 351 00:19:55,003 --> 00:19:59,593 S1: Yeah, absolutely. That's, uh, that's really interesting. And I like 352 00:19:59,593 --> 00:20:01,513 S1: that story a lot. I've done a bunch of work 353 00:20:01,513 --> 00:20:03,823 S1: in the safety space as well, and they take it 354 00:20:03,823 --> 00:20:06,403 S1: very seriously. And like you said, when you care, you 355 00:20:06,403 --> 00:20:10,453 S1: engineer a solution that solves that problem. And, uh, yeah, 356 00:20:10,453 --> 00:20:14,593 S1: I really like that analogy. Well, where can everyone, uh, 357 00:20:15,103 --> 00:20:17,233 S1: find find out about the product. 358 00:20:18,353 --> 00:20:20,993 S2: Yeah. So you could still find us at Callide. Com. 359 00:20:20,993 --> 00:20:23,993 S2: And today we still sell to folks who have Okta 360 00:20:23,993 --> 00:20:26,513 S2: so that none of that's changing. We're still open for business, 361 00:20:26,513 --> 00:20:30,203 S2: we're still selling our product. And in fact, we're starting 362 00:20:30,233 --> 00:20:32,873 S2: to reach out now to folks who don't have Okta. 363 00:20:32,873 --> 00:20:36,803 S2: So if you have Google Workspace or use Microsoft Entra, 364 00:20:36,803 --> 00:20:38,933 S2: we have something in the works that we're going to 365 00:20:38,933 --> 00:20:40,913 S2: be launching later this year. And we want to start 366 00:20:40,913 --> 00:20:43,583 S2: talking to folks to get their insights on what we're 367 00:20:43,583 --> 00:20:46,433 S2: building and to get them in a place where they 368 00:20:46,433 --> 00:20:50,063 S2: get even beta test it. So if you have Okta 369 00:20:50,063 --> 00:20:52,943 S2: today and you want to use something like collide, go 370 00:20:52,943 --> 00:20:58,043 S2: to collide comm, collide comm. And if you have something 371 00:20:58,043 --> 00:21:00,953 S2: different that you use for single sign on, hit us 372 00:21:00,953 --> 00:21:02,753 S2: up as well and we'll have a chat. 373 00:21:03,663 --> 00:21:05,403 S1: Awesome. Great talking to you. 374 00:21:06,483 --> 00:21:07,893 S2: Thank you so much for having me.